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ABSTRACT
Differences in house price and income growth rates between 1950 and 2000 across metropolitan
areas have led to an ever-widening gap in housing values and incomes between the typical and
highest-priced locations. We show that the growing spatial skewness in house prices and incomes
are related and can be explained, at least in part, by inelastic supply of land in some attractive
locations combined with an increasing number of high-income households nationally. Scarce land
leads to a bidding-up of land prices and a sorting of high-income families relatively more into those
desirable, unique, low housing construction markets, which we label “superstar cities.” Continued
growth  in  the  number  of  high-income  families  in  the  U.S.  provides  support  for  ever-larger
differences in house prices across inelastically supplied locations and income-based spatial sorting.
Our empirical work confirms a number of equilibrium relationships implied by the superstar cities
framework and shows that it occurs both at the metropolitan area level and at the sub-MSA level,
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 Over the last 50 years, the number of families in U.S. metropolitan areas doubled, with 
the number making more than $140,000 in real ($2000) terms increasing more than eight-fold 
according to the U.S. Census.  Gains in income growth have been concentrated in those high-
income families.  Piketty and Saez (2004) estimate that the fraction of income attributable to the 
top one percent of U.S. households rose from 11.4 percent in 1950 to 16.9 percent in 2000.   
Concurrently, two other patterns arose.  First, there has been a large dispersion in real 
house price appreciation rates across metropolitan areas and towns, with some appreciating at 
very high rates.  For example, real house price growth in the San Francisco primary metropolitan 
statistical area (PMSA) averaged about 3.5 percent per year between 1950 and 2000, more than 2 
percentage points higher than the national average.  These differences in long-run rates of 
appreciation led to an ever-widening gap in the price of housing between the most expensive 
metropolitan areas or communities and the average ones.  Indeed, the gap in prices between the 
most expensive metropolitan area (San Francisco) and the average across all areas doubled 
between 1970 and 2000.  San Francisco in 2000 had an average house price of almost $550,000, 
more than three times higher than the average.  Second, real income growth rates between 1950 
and 2000 and changes in the income distribution also varied widely across locations.  For 
example, in the San Francisco PMSA the share of families earning over $110,000 (in constant 
2000 dollars) grew by 21 percentage points between 1970 and 2000 versus 9 percentage points 
across all metropolitan areas. 
In this paper, we provide evidence that these patterns of spatial dispersion in house price 
and income growth are related: they are the inevitable result of increasing scarcity of land in 
certain metropolitan areas and towns, combined with a growing number of high income families 
nationally.  In places that are desirable but have low rates of new housing construction, families   2
with high incomes or strong preferences for that location outbid lower willingness-to-pay 
families for scarce housing, driving up the price of the underlying land.  As the number of high 
income families grows nationally, existing residents are outbid by even higher-income families, 
raising the price of land yet further.  By contrast, in municipalities where construction is easier, 
any family who wishes to live there – rich or poor – can buy in at the cost of constructing a new 
house and, instead of growth in house prices, the area exhibits growth in the quantity of houses.  
Land prices act as a clearing mechanism, so lower-income households are disproportionately 
excluded from cities that have limited supply, leaving behind concentrations of higher-income 
households.  In this sense, living in a superstar city is like owning a scarce luxury good. 
Over time, the gap in house prices between cities can keep increasing.  Even if each 
family individually is willing to pay only a fixed premium for a location, when the absolute 
number of rich families in the country increases and their incomes rise, there are more families 
who will pay a higher premium for the same perceived difference between cities.  Thus, a 
changing composition of residents in supply-constrained cities toward higher income families 
supports the growth in land prices. 
This process can continue as long as the growth in the income-weighted demand for a 
location exceeds the addition in supply, either in the original location or in a close substitute.  
Indeed, the inelastically supplied city need not be more desirable on average than any other city, 
nor do workers in the city need to enjoy increased productivity by moving there.  As long as the 
city appeals to a large enough clientele of families, a growing price gap and a shifting of the 
local income distribution to the right will occur.  We label metropolitan areas and towns where 
demand exceeds supply and supply growth is limited, “superstars.”  These superstar cities and 
towns are ones in which residents are willing to pay a premium to live and into which high-  3
income superstar-earners disproportionately sort.  These markets do not allow for increasing 
density through construction, cannot infinitely expand their borders, and have few close 
substitute locations. Our results emphasize that even seemingly generic MSAs, for some portion 
of the population, are not perfectly substitutable. 
This correlated skewness in house prices and the income distribution is a modern 
development at least at the metropolitan area level, because even the densest coastal markets had 
plenty of land available for development throughout much of the twentieth century.  Once these 
MSAs “filled up”, in the sense that adding units to the housing stock became difficult, both 
because of geographical limitations and local restrictions on increases in density, growth in 
house prices accelerated.   
We begin the analysis by documenting the long-run trends in house price and income 
growth and the spatial skewness that has arisen since 1950.  Next, we outline a simple two 
location model that shows how inelastic land supply can link these stylized patterns.  This model 
is similar in spirit to Epple and Platt (1998), but allows for differences in the elasticity of supply 
across locations, and generates a set of empirically testable predictions.  Systematic patterns in 
the data are consistent with the equilibrium predictions of this superstar cities model.   
First, the income-sorting predictions of the model are borne out in the data.  Income 
distributions in superstar cities are skewed to the right, and skew relatively more when the 
national number of high-income families rises.  Recent movers into superstar cities tend to be 
higher-income, on average, than recent movers into other cities, and recent movers out of 
superstar cities are drawn disproportionately from the bottom tail of the city’s income 
distribution.    4
Second, not only do superstar cities enjoy higher long-run house price growth, but prices 
in those markets are a higher multiple of current rents, suggesting that homebuyers there 
anticipate more rapid long-run rent and price growth.  In addition, when the total number of 
high-income families living in the U.S. grows more rapidly, the gap in house prices between 
superstar cities and other housing markets widens the most.   
These patterns are repeated when we compare superstar towns to other towns within their 
metropolitan areas.  “Superstar suburbs” typically have more high-income households and fewer 
poor ones, and experience a greater rightward shift in their income distributions and more rapid 
growth in their house prices when the number of high-income households in their MSAs rises.  
They, too, have higher price-to-rent ratios.  That we find similar evidence of ‘superstar suburbs’ 
is an important differentiator from models of urban agglomerations because labor productivity is 
unlikely to vary geographically based on where workers live within a given labor market area. 
Consistent with the model’s predictions, once an elastically supplied city or town “fills 
up” and future supply growth becomes limited, price-to-rent ratios increase, and income sorting 
and house price dispersion accelerates.  A number of jurisdictions in our sample undergo this 
transition into superstar status.  For example, Los Angeles and San Francisco are the first major 
metropolitan areas to become supply-limited, and that happened between 1960 and 1980.  The 
areas around Boston and New York followed between 1970 and 1990.   
The implications of the superstar cities framework are fundamentally different from those 
of existing urban models.  For example, standard compensating differential models attribute 
differences in prices across markets to variation in amenities and other local traits. [Roback 
(1982), Blomquist et al (1988), Gyourko and Tracy (1991)]  By contrast, the superstar cities 
view implies that limited land supply results in a rightward shift in the income distribution and   5
rising land prices that are neither due to changes in the innate attractiveness of living there nor in 
local productivity, but follow from an increasing number of high willingness-to-pay families in 
the population.   Second, the superstar cities intuition reverses the causality of typical 
agglomeration models in which moving to a location enhances a worker’s productivity. [Glaeser 
et al (1992, 1995), Henderson et al (1995), Rauch (1993), Moretti (2004a,b,c), Rosenthal and 
Strange (2001, 2003)]  Instead, high human capital (high income) workers concentrate in 
superstar cities because they can outbid less productive workers.  We do not claim that 
alternative explanations involving the potential impacts of human capital spillovers, production 
agglomeration effects, or preference externalities on housing markets are not valid, but we do 
show empirically that they cannot completely account for the patterns observed in the data.   
 
1.  Skewness and dispersion in house prices, incomes, and their long-run growth rates 
 
We begin by detailing the remarkable dispersion – and even skewness – across MSAs in 
house price and income growth over the 1950 to 2000 period.  Figure 1A plots the kernel density 
of average annual real house price growth between 1950 and 2000 for the 280 metropolitan areas 
with populations over 50,000 in 1950.
1 The tail of growth rates above 2.6 percent is especially 
thick and the distribution is right-skewed.  Table 1, which lists the average real annual house 
price growth rate between 1950 and 2000 for the ten fastest and ten slowest appreciating 
metropolitan areas out of the 50 MSAs with populations of at least 500,000 in 1950, documents 
that the dispersion seen in this figure is not an artifact of a few areas that were small initially and 
then experienced abnormally rapid price growth.   
These annual differences compound to very large price gaps over time even within the 
top few markets.  For example, San Francisco’s 3.5 percent annual house price appreciation 
                                                 
1 The Census data that underlies these calculations is described in Section 3.   6
implies a 458 percent increase in real house prices between 1950 and 2000, more than twice as 
large as seventh-ranked Boston at 212 percent, which itself still grew 50 percent more than the 
sample average of 132 percent for the 50 most populous metropolitan areas.
2  Figure 2A, which 
plots a kernel density estimate of the 280 metropolitan area average house values in 1950 and 
2000, shows that skewness has increased over the last 50 years, with a relative handful of 
markets ending up commanding enormous price premiums.  Figure 2B normalizes the means and 
standard deviations of the 1950 and 2000 house value distributions so they are equal and plots 
them against each other.  In 2000, the right tail of the MSA house value distribution extends to 
four times the mean, more than twice the highest MSA from the right tail of the 1950 Census.  
The left tail ends at about half the mean in both years, although it is slightly more skewed in the 
2000 Census.   
  There is also long-run persistence in the markets which exhibit above-average price 
growth.  Across the two 30-year periods from 1940-1970 and 1970-2000, average annual 
percentage house price growth has a positive correlation of about 0.3.  Moreover, of the MSAs in 
the top quartile of annual house price growth between 1940 and 1970, half were still in the top 
quartile and nearly two-thirds remained ranked in the top half between 1970 and 2000.
3  
  Income growth rates, as well, demonstrate wide dispersion across MSAs over the long-
run.  Figure 1B plots the kernel density of average annual real income growth over the 1950 to 
2000 period.  Growth rates range from 0.8 percent per year to 3.1 percent, and the distribution 
also evinces some right-skew. 
                                                 
2 It is worth emphasizing that the extremely high appreciation seen in the Bay Area, southern California, and Seattle 
markets is not restricted to the past couple of decades.  The top five markets in terms of annual real appreciation 
rates between 1950-1980 are as follows:  (1) San Francisco, 3.65 percent;  (2) San Diego, 3.49 percent;  (3) Los 
Angeles, 3.20 percent;  (4) Oakland, 2.99 percent;  and (5) Seattle, 2.88 percent.  
3 Over short horizons, such as a decade, MSAs can experience large price swings.  The correlation in house price 
growth rates across contiguous decades often is significantly negative.     7
 
2. Superstar  Cities 
We turn to a simple model to show that the stylized facts in the previous section may be 
linked through the elasticity of supply of land.  In our model, households vary by their incomes 
and tastes for two locations which differ by whether they have available land. Epple and Platt 
(1998, henceforth known as EP) present a more formal and extensive treatment of a similar 
model, but assume that land supply is perfectly inelastic in all jurisdictions. By limiting the 
model to two cities and allowing for elastic supply in one, we emphasize the testable empirical 
implications of differences in the elasticity of supply.  In addition, our results do not depend 
upon the reasons for location preferences or inelasticity of supply, so we neither attempt to 
discern why some families prefer certain cities nor address the causes of limited supply. 
A.  A Simple Model of Superstar Cities 
There are two cities: a red city (R) and a green city (G).  The red city does not allow new 
development and has a fixed size of K units of housing.  The green city has a perfectly elastic 
supply of new housing units.
4 
There are N workers in the economy, with a continuum of worker skills.  Wages are 
increasing in skill, but are independent of a worker’s location, so worker productivity is 
unrelated to the number or concentration of high-skilled workers in R or G.   Define n(W) as the 
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4 While we realize that land is not perfectly elastically supplied anywhere, the ease with which builders construct 
new units clearly differs across the country, as shown by Gyourko and Glaeser (2003), Glaeser, Gyourko, and Saks 
(2005b), and  Saks (2005).     8
Each worker has an intensity of preference, c, uniformly distributed between 0 and 1, to 
live in the red versus green city.
5  The higher is c, the more that a worker prefers to live in G.  
The preference to live in R or G is independent of income. 
Workers choose two items in their consumption bundle: a city to live in (R or G), and a 
quantity of the composite good, A.  The price of A is normalized to 1.  The rental cost of 
agricultural land is l.  By assumption, land is perfectly elastically supplied in G so that residents 
can always acquire an additional lot at rent l in the green city.  If more than K households prefer 
the red city, residents of R must pay a per-period rent r+l with the rent premium r>0 determined 
based on bidding as described below.   
We assume that a worker gets utility from consumption of A, as follows: 
         U
R ≡ (1-c)f(A) and A=w-r    if worker resides in city R 
   U = 
U
G ≡ cf(A) and A=w      if worker resides in city G. 
 
For simplicity, we normalize w= W-l.  This specification assumes that a worker obtains higher 
utility from consumption when its preference for its current location is stronger. However, all of 
our results presented below still hold if consumption benefits from location and all other goods 
were separable. 
B.  Solution: 
A worker will choose to live in R and pay rent premium r if and only if U
R > U
G, or 
(1−c)f(w−r) > cf(w). If N/2<=K, r=0 since the red city still has open land and residents sort into 
R and G solely based on whether c is less than or greater than 1/2.  We will restrict our attention 
to the case of N/2>K, so that the expected rent premium in the red city will be strictly positive.   
                                                 
5 Reasonable alternatives to a uniform distribution of tastes exacerbate the income sorting predictions.  Suppose the 
Red city is preferred to the Green city by all workers.  Then, only high-wage workers end-up in R because they are 
the only workers that can afford to live there.  Of course, as Epple and Platt (1998) point out, a single preference 
model cannot literally be true, otherwise we would observe pure income sorting.  Intermediate cases in which higher 
income workers have a moderate preference for R versus G would not change our qualitative predictions.   9
The market-clearing rent premium, r
*, equates the number of workers desiring to live in R 
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The function c
*(w) is the maximum c such that a worker with wage w will choose to live in R and 
pay rent premium r
*.  When w ≤ r
*, then c
*(w) = 0; that is, workers cannot afford to live in R 
unless their wage is greater than the rent required to live in R.  When w > r
*, c
*(w) represents the 
preference of a worker of a given wage who is just indifferent between living in R or G.  So 
workers with wage w and preference c< c
*(w) will choose to live in R.  
C.  Simulation Results: 
To demonstrate the effect of inelastic supply of land on land prices and income sorting, 
we perform a simple simulation.  The simulated economy has 100,000 workers, but only 30,000 
spaces in city R, and a truncated normal wage distribution with discrete $1,000 increments, a 
mean wage of $40,000, a standard deviation of $40,000, the lowest wage truncated at 0, and the 
highest wage truncated at $150,000.  As above, wages are defined as compensation earned in 
excess of the agricultural rent, l.  The location preference c is uniformly distributed between 0 
and 1, and f(A)=A.  Solving for the market-clearing rent premium yields r
*= $19,257, or almost 
40 percent of the average wage.
6  
Prediction 1:  Rents, the average wage, and the share of high income workers are higher in R 
than in G. 
Explanation for Prediction 1:  
                                                 
6 The average wage in the economy is actually $51,246 given that the lower truncation wage of $0 removes more of 
the low wage workers relative to the upper truncation wage of $150,000.     10
Figure 3 graphs the wage distributions in the red and green cities, with the number of 
residents in G equal to the difference between the two solid lines.  A disproportionate share of 
higher income workers, and no one at all earning below $19,257, lives in the red city. 
This result is purely due to the scarcity of locations in R.  At zero rent premium, any 
worker with c<0.5 would prefer to live in the red city.  Since more workers prefer R than there 
are spots, the clearing rent premium is strictly positive, and each worker trades off its intensity of 
preference for the red city with the rent premium.  For example, any worker with income less 
than r* is better off in the free green city, no matter what its value of c.  A low-wage worker with 
w just above r* will choose R only if c is close to zero, and a high-income worker with w well 
above r* will choose R as long as c is at least slightly below 0.5.  Thus the income distribution in 
R is skewed to the right.
7   
Note that this sorting occurs even though a given worker is equally productive in R and G 
and worker preferences are independent of income.
8  Indeed, with a uniform distribution of c, 
more than half of the high wage workers live in the green city.  This is because half of the 
workers actually prefer the green city and those on the cusp choose to live in the green city 
versus paying a rent premium r* to live in the red city.  High-income residents comprise a 
smaller share of the green city since it is larger than R, with well more than half of the low-
income workers living there.     
Prediction 2:  Population growth leads to a higher rent premium, higher prices, and more skewed 
wages in R relative to G.  
                                                 
7 Epple and Platt (1998) obtain a similar partial sorting by income.  In EP, sorting arises because families have 
preferences over a bundle of public goods and tax rates which are provided in different amounts across inelastically 
supplied locations.  In our illustrative model, we allow for differences in the elasticity of land supply but do not 
specify why a household might prefer one location over another. 
8 Because we do not incorporate peer effects or increasing returns to skill, [Moretti (2004b,c)] there is no 
countervailing pecuniary incentive for high wage workers with a preference for G to live in R anyway.  Given that 
the density of high wage workers is higher in R but the absolute number of high wage workers is higher in G, it is 
unclear where such effects would be greater.   11
Explanation for Prediction 2: 
Suppose that population doubles from 100,000 to 200,000 but the number of spots in R is 
unchanged.  The equilibrium rent premium increases from $19,257 to $41,263 as the number of 
households with c<0.5 doubles.
9   Figure 4 illustrates that the wage distribution in the red city 
also shifts to the right.  Thus, population growth leads to an even more skewed distribution of 
wages for workers living in R relative to G.  Some families who previously had a strong 
preference to live in R will no longer have the income necessary to cover the r
*, and others will 
no longer prefer it at the higher rent.  Families with the lowest incomes are disproportionately 
priced out of R as the national population grows.
  
Assuming house prices equal the present discounted value of rents, markets with higher 
rent levels will also have higher house prices.  Rent and price premiums are due to the 
underlying scarcity of land, not the cost of housing structures, which is similar across markets.
10 
Prediction 3:  A thicker right tail in the aggregate wage distribution leads to higher rents 
and wages in R relative to G. 
Explanation for Prediction 3: 
Even without population growth, an increase in income inequality raises the average 
income and thus the willingness-to-pay of the marginal worker who prefers R.  Thus the rent 
premium rises in R, but less so than in the case of population growth because the number of 
families who prefer R does not increase.  Higher rent, in turn, displaces relatively more low-wage 
workers in favor of high wage workers.  This process is illustrated in Figure 5, where the 
standard deviation of the truncated wage distribution is raised to $80,000.   
                                                 
9 The specific percentage change in rent is dependent on the parameter values.  Eventually the cutoff rent must grow 
more slowly than the population because the upper support of the truncated normal distribution does not change. 
10 Gyourko and Saiz (forthcoming) show that the cost of construction has been declining in real terms, while real 
house prices have risen almost everywhere in the U.S.   12
Prediction 4:  When aggregate population growth and/or a spreading to the right of the overall 
income distribution is anticipated, R will have a higher price/rent ratio than G.
  
Explanation for Prediction 4:  
The comparative statics in predictions 2 and 3 demonstrate that population growth or a 
right-skewing of the income distribution lead to higher rents in R (r
*>0).  This prediction 
assumes that expected long-run risk-adjusted returns to investing in housing in the two cities are 
equated by the market, where rent is analogous to the dividend paid by a house.  If workers 
anticipate that rents in R will grow faster than agricultural rents, they will bid up house prices so 
that the overall return for a house in R is equal to the return on a house in G.  If R has a faster 
growth rate of rents than G, that market will also have the same faster stationary growth rate in 
prices. 
Priced fairly, a house in R earns a lower current yield (lower rent/price ratio), but a higher 
future capital gain due to the faster rent and price growth than in G.  Thus, when the number of 
high-income families is growing, the price/rent ratio should be higher in R than G.  In fact, house 
price levels are higher in R for two reasons: both land rents and the price-to-rent ratio are higher 
in R than in G. 
Prediction 5:  An unexpected increase in the relative growth rate of rents in R implies a higher 
steady state growth rate in prices in R and an increase in the price-to-rent ratio.
  
Explanation for Prediction 5:  
With stationary growth in rents, the price/rent ratios will be fixed.  If there is an 
unanticipated shock to the growth rate of rents, the price/rent ratio and the growth rate of prices 
can deviate from its steady-state trend.  If a city runs out of developable land, thereby 
transitioning from a city like G to a superstar city like R, the growth rate of rents (and prices) will   13
rise accordingly.  In the short-term, house prices will grow more quickly than rents as the 
price/rent ratio rises to reflect the new higher growth rate of rents.  Owners in the newly-created 
superstar city will earn a one-time capital gain. 
   
3. Data  description 
  We use data from the U.S. decennial census, aggregated to three different levels: the 
metropolitan area, which corresponds to the local labor market, the Census-designated place, 
which is a political entity such as a city or town, and the household.  At the metro area and the 
census-designated place levels we obtain information on the distribution of house values, family 
incomes, population, and the number of housing units.
11  For the analysis across metropolitan 
areas, we use a sample of 280 such areas that had populations of at least 50,000 in 1950 and are 
in the continental United States.
12   
                                                 
11 Census house price data are imperfect in that they are self-reported and not quality adjusted.  We use them 
because the length of the panel available allows us to observe the evolution of superstar markets over time.  While 
correlations between constant quality and unadjusted series can be weak at annual frequencies, the correlation over 
the decadal periods, which are the unit of analysis here, is quite high.  For example, from 1980-1990 and 1990-2000, 
the sole time periods for which both Census and constant quality data from the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise 
Oversight are available, the correlation in appreciation rates for a set of consistently defined MSAs is 0.94 in the 
1980s and 0.87 in the 1990s.   
12 Thirty-six areas with populations under 50,000 in 1950 were excluded from our analysis because of concerns 
about abnormal house quality changes in markets with so few units at the start of our period of analysis.  Those 
MSAs are:  Auburn-Opelika, Barnstable, Bismarck, Boulder, Brazoria, Bryan, Casper, Cheyenne, Columbia, 
Corvallis, Dover, Flagstaff, Fort Collins, Fort Myers, Fort Pierce, Fort Walton Beach, Grand Junction, Iowa City, 
Jacksonville, Las Cruces, Lawrence, Melbourne, Missoula, Naples, Ocala, Olympia, Panama City, Pocatello, Punta 
Gorda, Rapid City, Redding, Rochester, Santa Fe, Victoria, Yolo, and Yuma.  That said, none of our key results are 
materially affected by this paring of the sample.  Similar concerns account for our not using data from the first 
Census of Housing in 1940 in the regression results reported below.  (All individual housing trait data from the 1940 
census were lost, so we cannot track any trait changes over time from that year.)  However, we did repeat our MSA-
level analysis over the 1940-2000 time period.  While the point estimates naturally differ from those reported below, 
the magnitudes, signs, and statistical significance are essentially unchanged.  Finally, the New York PMSA is 
missing crucial house price data for 1960, and is excluded from the analysis reported below.  The census did not 
report house value data for that year because it did not believe it could accurately assess value for cooperative units, 
the preponderant unit type in Manhattan at that time.   14
  Since the definitions of metro areas change over time, we use one based on 1990 county 
boundaries to project consistent metro area boundaries forward and backward through time.
13  
Data were collected at the county level and aggregated to the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) 
or primary metropolitan statistical area (PMSA) level in the case of consolidated metropolitan 
statistical areas.
14  Data for the 1970-2000 period are obtained from GeoLytics, which compiles 
long-form data from the decennial Censuses of Housing and Population.  We hand-collected 
1950 and 1960 data from hard copy volumes of the Census of Population and Housing.  Both 
sources are based on 100 percent population counts.  For the analysis within MSAs, we extract 
place-level data for 1970-2000 from the GeoLytics CD-ROMs.
15  All dollar values are converted 
into constant 2000 dollars.   
  Household-level data comes from the Integrated Public Use Micro Samples (IPUMs), 
which provide a set of matched variables using common definitions across decades.  We use 
family income and the MSA of residence five years prior in an analysis of recent movers 
reported below.  If the resident lived in a different MSA than the current one five years ago, that 
individual is an in-migrant to the current MSA and an out-migrant from the host MSA five years 
previously.  We restrict the household sample to 1980 and 1990 because the ‘MSA-five-years-
ago’ variable did not exist prior to 1980 (except for a few MSAs in 1940), and in 2000 the 
number of MSAs identified in the IPUMs was drastically reduced. 
                                                 
13 We use definitions provided by the Office of Management and Budget, available at 
http://www.census.gov/population/estimates/metro-city/90mfips.txt. 
14 All our conclusions are robust to aggregating to the CMSA level for those few areas with that designation. 
15While states differ in the extent to which local jurisdictions control new construction or even whether they can 
change their boundaries, census-designated places provide a useful comparable sample.  The 1970 data include only 
6,963 out of 20,768 places.  (Conversations with the Census Bureau suggest that the micro data on the remaining 
places has been lost or is not readily available.)  Fortunately, these places account for more than 95 percent of U.S. 
population in 1970.  In 2000, 161 million people lived in these 6,963 places, 206 million people in all places, and 
281 million people in the entire U.S.  We further limit the sample to places within a MSA.     15
  In each data set, we divide the distribution of real family incomes into five categories that 
are consistent over time.  The income categories in the original Census data change in each 
decade.  We set the category boundaries equal to 25, 50, 75, and 100 percent of the 1980 family 
income topcode, and populate the resulting five bins using a weighted average of the actual 
categories in $2000, assuming a uniform distribution of families within the bins.  Since 1980 had 
amongst the lowest topcode in real terms, using it as an upper bound reduces miscategorization 
of families into income bins.  We call a family “poor” if its income is less than $39,179 in $2000.  
“Middle-poor” are those families with incomes between $39,179 and $78,358, “middle” income 
families have incomes between $78,359 and $117,537, “middle-rich” families lie between 
$117,538 and $156,716, and “rich” families have incomes in excess of the 1980 real topcode of 
$156,716. 
 
4.  A case study of San Francisco and Las Vegas 
A case study of two cities illustrates how the superstar city dynamic plays out in practice.  
Over the last 50 years the U.S. has experienced growth in the absolute number, population share, 
and income share of high-income households.  [Autor et al (2006), Piketty and Saez (2003), Saez 
(2004)]  The left panel of Figure 6 shows that the aggregate distribution of family income across 
all MSAs in the U.S. has been shifting to the right in real dollars as the right tail of the income 
distribution has grown much faster than the mean.  The right panel of Figure 6 displays the 
evolution of the number of families, rather than the share, in each of the income bins.  Most of 
the growth in the number of families was among those earning more than the $78,358 median 
value for our sample.   16
  These changes in the national high-income share were accompanied by very disparate 
patterns at the metropolitan area level.  San Francisco, a canonical superstar city, experienced 
low levels of new construction and high house price growth.  Between 1950 and 1960, the San 
Francisco primary metropolitan statistical area (PMSA) expanded its population by about 48,000 
families.  Over the subsequent four decades, San Francisco grew by only 44,000 families, with 
two-thirds of that growth taking place between 1960 and 1970.  Real house prices (in constant 
$2000 dollars) spiked in San Francisco after 1970, growing between 3 and 4 percent per year 
between 1970 and 1990, about 1.5 percentage points above the average across all MSAs, and 1.4 
percent per year between 1990 and 2000, almost one percentage point above the all-MSA 
average.   
  By contrast, over the same time period, Las Vegas was a canonical high-demand, 
elastically supplied non-superstar city.  Las Vegas saw explosive population growth, growing 
from fewer than 50,000 families in 1960 to the size of San Francisco by 2000.  Yet it 
experienced modest real house price growth that was well below the national average.   
  Consistent with the income distribution predictions of the superstar cities model, as the 
number of high-income families in the country increased, San Francisco’s share high-income 
grew disproportionately.   San Francisco (Figure 7), which always had relatively more rich 
families and fewer poor families than Las Vegas (Figure 8), became even more skewed toward 
high income families between 1960 and 2000.  Since the number of families in the San Francisco 
MSA did not grow by much, the MSA actually experienced an increase in the number of rich 
families and a reduction in the number of lower income ones.  In fact, only the richest groups, 
with incomes of $78,358 and above, increased their share of the number of families in the San 
Francisco MSA.     17
  By contrast, the overall income distribution in Las Vegas did not keep up with the nation 
(left panel of Figure 8), leaving Las Vegas progressively more poor relative to both San 
Francisco and the U.S. metropolitan area aggregate. The large numbers of new families in Las 
Vegas were both rich and poor, leading to pro rata growth in the number of families across Las 
Vegas’ income distribution.  Relative to the national income distribution, which shifted right, the 
growth in Las Vegas was skewed towards poorer families. 
  In the remainder of this paper, we show empirically that these patterns and the 
equilibrium predictions of the model generalize to all MSAs and towns. 
 
5.  How do we determine if a city is a superstar?  
Following the model in Section 2, superstars must be in high demand, relative to supply, 
with demand manifested more in price growth than in housing unit growth because of binding 
restrictions on the development of new sites.  We neither observe the true state of demand nor 
the elasticity of supply, so we define a superstar city using housing market outcomes.  Growth in 
mean real prices and housing units at the MSA level is measured over 20-year periods.  This 
window size gives us growth rates defined over four time periods: 1950-70, 1960-80, 1970-90, 
and 1980-2000.  We match each growth rate to the characteristics of the market at the end of the 
window so, for example, the 1950-70 growth rates are matched to 1970 data.
16 
  A MSA is categorized as a superstar if it exhibits high demand, defined as whether its 
sum of price and quantity growth over the prior two decades is above the sample median, and it 
                                                 
16 We chose this algorithm because the model suggests that the predicted income segregation and house price effects 
occur after the superstar market has ‘filled up’.  The use of lagged data helps guard against us misclassifying an area 
as a superstar too early.  Also, we wish to classify superstar status of metro areas in the most recent census year, 
2000.  That said, this choice is not critical to our results.  For example, we could match 1950-1970 growth rates to 
metro areas as of 1960.  That methodology generates superstar classifications from 1960-1990, rather than from 
1970-2000.   Our findings are robust to such changes.    18
has a low elasticity of supply, indicated by a high ratio of price growth to quantity growth.  We 
allow the high-demand cutoff to vary over time to account for changes in the aggregate 
economy.  By contrast, the cutoff for having a low elasticity of supply should not vary over time 
since aggregate changes in demand should not affect the ratio of price growth to unit growth.  
Hence, we use the 90
th percentile of the distribution of price growth to quantity growth for all 
metropolitan areas over the entire period, which is about 1.7. 
  Superstar markets as of 2000, determined using 1980-2000 growth rates, lay in the region 
marked A in Figure 9, which plots average real annual house price growth between 1980 and 
2000 against housing unit growth.  Thus high-demand cities are far from the origin and 
inelastically supplied markets are close to the y-axis.  Region A is both above the downward-
sloping boundary determining high growth status and above the leftmost upwards-sloping line 
marking significant inelasticity of supply.  The cities in A include many coastal markets such as 
San Francisco, New York, and Boston.   
  A metro area has a high elasticity of supply if it builds sufficient new housing to satisfy 
demand so that real price growth is low and housing unit production is relatively high, placing it 
close to the x-axis in Figure 9.  We label these cities with high demand but with a ratio of price 
growth to quantity growth being less than 1/1.7 (about 0.59) as ‘Non-superstars’.  Non-superstars 
are in the C range, below the less-steeply upwards-sloped line and above the downward-sloped 
demand cutoff.  They include markets such as Las Vegas and Phoenix.  The remaining high 
demand markets, in-between the superstars and non-superstars, lay in the B range.  They have 
experienced relatively high demand, and have built at least a modest amount of new units and 
experienced a moderate amount of real house price appreciation.  The final category consists of   19
metropolitan areas that are in low demand, defined as the sum of price and quantity growth 
below the sample median, and lies in the D region below the negatively-sloped line.
17 
  We chose to use a discrete method of identifying superstar cities to ease the interpretation 
of the empirical results.  As will be discussed in the results section, our findings are not affected 
by this decision.   
  At the Census place level, we use a parallel methodology to determine which places are 
superstars.  A place is considered to be high-demand if its sum of price and housing unit growth 
exceeds that period’s median across all places in all MSAs.  It is a superstar place if it is both 
high-demand and inelastically supplied, defined as the ratio of price growth to unit growth 
exceeding the 75
th percentile, or 4.06.  Some places experience high price growth but declines in 
the number of housing units.  To keep the ratio greater than zero, in such places we set the ratio 
equal to the sample maximum ratio.  Similarly, non-superstar places have high demand and 
elastic supply, with a ratio below the inverse of the 75
th percentile.  If housing unit growth is 
positive but prices have fallen, we set the ratio of price growth to unit growth equal to the lowest 
positive sample value.  Since place data is available only for 1970 to 2000, we assign superstar 
or non-superstar categories to places in 1990 and 2000. 
  In the face of geographic constraints and politically-imposed restrictions on development, 
it seems natural that high-demand metropolitan areas could become more inelastically supplied 
over time as they grow and begin to “fill up”.  This process would appear as a market moving 
over time from area C to B to A.  Comparing Figures 9 and 10, we observe such an evolution.  In 
1980, only San Francisco and Los Angeles clearly qualified as superstars, as can be seen in 
                                                 
17 We do not distinguish between low-demand areas on the basis of inelasticity of supply.  As Glaeser and Gyourko 
(2005) note, the existence of durable housing makes most cities appear to be inelastically supplied when demand 
falls.  Thus inelastic supply in a low-demand city does not necessarily reflect constraints on new development.   20
Figure 10 which plots the price growth-to-unit growth relationship over the 1960-1980 period.
18  
Between 1980 and  2000, twenty more MSAs filled up, becoming superstars. 
  
6.  Implications of superstar cities:  income distributions and house prices 
  An important set of predictions of our framework is that a superstar city’s household 
income should be skewed to the right of the U.S. income distribution, and should become more 
skewed as the right tail of the national income distribution becomes thicker and as the MSA fills 
up. 
  A.  Income distributions across MSAs 
  To see if this pattern holds across all MSAs, we estimate the following regression for 
MSA i in year t:  
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This regression relates the share of a MSA’s families that are in each income bin to its superstar 
status, and controls for total demand.  The model implies that superstar cities should have 
relatively larger shares of rich or middle-rich families (highest and second-highest income bins, 
respectively) and lower shares of those in the lowest income bins.
19 
  The first column of the top panel of table 2 is based on a pooled cross section of 1,116 
MSA × year observations.
20  This regression treats superstar status as a (non-exclusive) fixed 
MSA characteristic, including indicator variables for whether the MSA ever was a superstar over 
the 1970-2000 period, whether it is ever in the non-superstar range, whether the MSA ever 
                                                 
18 Enid, OK, barely makes it into ‘superstar’ territory in this time period.  This appears to be the result of an 
extraordinary, but temporary, oil industry-related shock, as this area is not a superstar later.   
19 See Appendix Table 1 for summary statistics on all variables used in these regressions. 
20 This represents 279 MSAs in each census year from 1970-on.   21
moved inside the low-demand area, and time dummies.  The intermediate, high demand MSAs 
from region B are the excluded category in all the metro area regressions.
21 
  The difference in income distribution between superstars and all other MSAs is 
pronounced.  MSAs that ever were superstars have a 2.5 percentage point greater share of their 
families that are in the rich category relative to the excluded high-demand cities (row 1, column 
1).  This effect is largest at the high end of the income distribution and declines in magnitude as 
incomes fall.  For example, as reported in square brackets in row 1, the high income share of 
superstar MSAs is about 83 percent more than the 3 percent share rich for the average MSA that 
is not a superstar.  The share of the next-highest income category is 69 percent greater in 
superstars relative to the average of other MSAs, and 34 percent higher in the middle category.  
Markets that have ever been superstars also have a nearly 9 percentage point lower share of poor 
families (row 1, column 5), almost 21 percent less than the other MSAs.   
  Non-superstar cities appear similar to the in-between group (row 2).  Those coefficients 
are relatively small and do not exhibit a clear pattern.  Low-demand MSAs are less high-income 
and poorer relative to all of the high demand categories of MSAs, although the magnitudes are 
modest (row 3).   
  The superstar cities model suggests that superstar cities should become richer and less 
poor when they transition into the superstar region.  The second panel of Table 2 addresses this 
hypothesis by adding time-varying superstar, non-superstar, and low demand indicator variables 
to the previous specifications.  Prior to becoming superstars, MSAs that eventually will become a 
                                                 
21 Our qualitative results and statistical significance in this table and those below are robust to changing the cutoffs 
between the regions, including continuous measures of the degree of superstardom, or removing from the superstar 
(or non-superstar) ranks any city that failed to qualify as such in at least two consecutive periods.  For example, we 
have tried including the ratio of price growth to quantity growth, the sum of price and quantity growth, and the 
interaction of the two, as superstar fundamentals.  We have also tried including price growth and quantity growth 
separately.  These specifications lead to the same conclusions, though they are more difficult to describe concisely.  
The results are available from the authors.   22
superstar are richer on average, with a 1.3 percentage point greater share rich and a 7.1 
percentage point lower share poor (row 1 of panel 2).  When these areas are actually in the 
superstar region, their share rich goes up by an additional 2.8 percentage points and their share 
poor declines by a further 4.1 percentage points (row 4 of panel 2).  Thus superstar cities, as a 
baseline, have a 43 percent higher share rich, declining monotonically to 17 percent lower share 
poor, than other MSAs.  After their transition to superstar status, these MSAs have an additional 
80 to 90 percent greater share of the top two income groups and an 8 to 10 percent lower share of 
the bottom two income categories.  As before, this pattern of results is robust to adding a host of 
controls for potential unobservables, such as MSA fixed effects, differential time trends for 
superstars vs. not, or separate year dummies for superstars/non-superstars/low-demand MSAs. 
  The data do not indicate nearly as much income skewing among non-superstars or low 
demand MSAs relative to the omitted group.  For example, when MSAs transition into being 
non-superstars or low demand MSAs, they appear to lose a small share of rich relative to poor, 
although not all of these coefficients are statistically different from zero at conventional levels.   
  B. Income distributions across places within MSAs 
Next, we turn to analogous regressions for superstar places within MSAs.  Examining 
changes in house prices and income distributions at the census-designated place level has several 
clear advantages over the MSA level.  The most important is that by using sub-MSA variation, 
we can control for MSA-level factors, such as agglomeration or other production externalities 
that affect the common labor market.  By including MSA × year fixed effects, we compare 
places within an MSA in a given year.  Another advantage is that places exhibit much more 
variation in changes in the overall income distribution than do MSAs.  On the downside, the 
place-level data is noisier than the MSA data, and covers a shorter time period.   23
  When we regress the share of households in an income category on the time-invariant 
measure of place superstar status, using the full 1970 to 2000 sample and controlling for MSA × 
year effects, places that were ever a superstar have a higher fraction of their families in the richer 
categories and a lower percentage in the poorer categories.  The estimates are reported in the first 
row of the first panel of Table 3.  Superstar places have a 5.2 percentage point higher share rich 
than do places in the same MSA and year that are in the in-between omitted category, an increase 
of nearly 150 percent from the sample mean.  These places have a 28 percent greater share in the 
middle-rich category, and anywhere from a 3 to 11 percent lower share in the three poorest 
categories.  The non-superstar and low-demand places show the opposite pattern, except in the 
poorest category, with generally a lower share of high-income, and a higher share of low-
income, families.  Both of these patterns are statistically different from zero at conventional 
levels. 
  In the second panel of Table 3, we add the time-varying superstar variables.   Even when 
they are not yet superstars, superstar places are relatively more high-income and relatively less 
poor.  In the years that a place is a superstar, it has an even larger share of its families in the 
highest income category.  For example, relative to the omitted in-between group, a place that will 
eventually be a superstar has a 3.7 percentage point, or more than 80 percent, greater share in the 
rich category.  When that place is a superstar, the share in the rich category increases by 4.2 
percentage points, or 85 percent of the mean.  Once again, we observe the reverse pattern for the 
non-superstar places.  The patterns are somewhat less distinct because we are limited to the small 
sample of 7,584 observations over 1990 to 2000, but one can see that the same general pattern 
holds at both the MSA and place levels, and using the time-varying or time-invariant definitions   24
of superstar status.  Finally, the bottom panel shows that we obtain similar cross-section results 
whether we use the full sample or the smaller 1990-2000 places sample. 
C.  What happens to local house prices and the share rich when the aggregate number 
of rich rises? 
 
  Another implication of the superstar cities model is that when the number of rich families 
in the country increases, land prices should rise fastest in superstar MSAs since the clearing price 
goes up to equilibrate the limited supply of houses with the increased demand.  Similarly, the 
income distributions in the superstar cities should shift to the right more than in other cities when 
there are more rich families at the national level—as long as some of the added rich families 
have a preference for the inelastic markets.  The superstar cities model also predicts analogous 
patterns at the place level, with the number of rich families at the MSA level positively 
correlated with the growth of prices and the rich share of the families in the superstar places. 
  First, we examine whether house values in superstar MSAs are linked to the number of 
rich families at the national level.  We regress a proxy for the entry price of a house – the 10
th 
percentile house value – on the time invariant city status variable (superstar, non superstar, and 
low demand) interacted with the national number rich, plus year and MSA fixed effects, for the 
1970-2000 sample period, with the results reported in Table 4.  Note that the MSA fixed effects 
subsume the non-interacted superstar indicator variables and the year dummies subsume the non-
interacted national number rich, so our estimates are identified from MSA × year variation.   
  The results in column 1 show that entry level houses in superstar cities are even more 
expensive relative to other cities when the U.S. has more rich families.  Indeed, when the 
national number of rich families is 10 percent higher, the gap in the 10
th percentile house value 
between the MSAs that are ever superstars and the in-between MSAs is 1.1 percent greater.
22  
                                                 
22 We find similar results using the average house value rather than the 10
th percentile.   25
However, one should note that our true variation is limited since we observe only four changes in 
the number of rich families for the metropolitan U.S. as a whole and are merely observing that 
something is happening disproportionately to superstar MSAs at those times. 
  This is not the case at the place level, where each of the 279 “parent” MSAs has its own 
pattern of growth in the number of rich families over four decades.  Once again, the 10
th 
percentile house price for each place is regressed on the interaction of place superstar status and 
the number of rich families in the MSA.  We include place fixed effects, and MSA × year effects 
to control for MSA-level dynamics.  We use all four census years and the time-invariant 
definition of superstar places.   
The places results in column 2 of Table 4 show that the entry house price is 0.98 percent 
higher in superstar places relative to the in-between places in the same MSA in the years when 
an MSA’s number rich is 10 percent greater.  The in-between places have 10
th percentile prices 
that are 1.81 percent higher relative to the non-superstar places when the MSAs’ number rich is 
10 percent higher.  We obtain very similar results when we restrict the sample to those places 
that appear in our data in all four decades (column 3) and when we exclude places with fewer 
than an average of 500 families (not shown). 
  In the right-hand panel of Table 4, we repeat the exercise with the share of the families in 
the MSA (or place) that are in the “rich” category as our dependent variable.  Again, the income 
distribution in superstars shifts to the right the most when the number of rich families is the 
largest.  Column 4 shows that, at the MSA level, a 10 percent rise in the national number rich is 
correlated with a 0.31 percentage point greater rise in the share rich for superstar cities relative to 
in-between cities in the same year.  At the place level, a 10 percent rise in a MSA’s number rich 
is correlated with a 0.22 percentage point greater rise in the share rich for its superstar places   26
relative to its in-between places.  Again, the place results are robust to including only those 
places that are in our sample for 1970-2000 (column 6) or excluding places with fewer than an 
average of 500 families. 
D.  Mobility and superstar cities 
  The superstar cities model suggests that rising incomes in a city are due to a changing 
composition of families within superstar cities from an influx of highly productive high-income 
workers, rather than through gains in existing residents’ productivity.  Ideally, one could 
distinguish between these alternatives by comparing workers’ wages before and after 
exogenously moving to a superstar city.  If the superstar city had a positive influence on wages 
over and above what the worker earned prior to moving, that would provide evidence in support 
of agglomeration benefits.  But, if the type of worker who moved to the city was already high-
income so that his arrival changed the income distribution of the destination city, the pattern 
would be more consistent with superstar cities.  Unfortunately, in our data we do not observe 
preexisting wages (or exogenous moves), so we compare the distributions of recent in-migrants 
and out-migrants in superstar cities and non-superstars to identify whether the share of in-
migrants who are currently high-income is greater in superstar cities.   
The top panel of Table 5 shows that the income distribution of recent movers into 
superstar cities is shifted toward relatively more “rich” families.  Each column corresponds to the 
regression of the share of the MSA’s recent movers (in-migrants in the top panel, out-migrants in 
the bottom panel) in a particular income bin on the MSA’s superstar/non-superstar status, a year 
dummy, and an indicator for low demand status.  The out-migrant regressions also include the 
share of the MSA’s families in the income category as a control for the at-risk-of-moving 
population.  The sample contains 231 MSAs with migration data in 1980 and 1990.  Relative to   27
recent in-migrants in the omitted intermediate B category or in non-superstars, superstar MSAs 
have fewer low-income in-migrants and more middle-to-upper income ones.  This difference in 
income distribution is more than twice as thick as the average density of long-time residents on 
the rich end and half as thick at the low-income end (see the numbers in square brackets).  The 
difference in the income distributions of in-migrants between superstar and non-superstar MSAs 
is statistically significant in all but the “middle-poor” income category. 
There is not such a strong pattern for out-migrants.  Superstar MSAs typically do have a 
lower fraction of rich out-migrants and a higher fraction of poor out-migrants.  However, these 
effects are statistically distinguishable from the in-between MSAs in only three of the five 
columns and from the non-superstar MSAs in only one case at the 95 percent confidence level 
(and two more cases at the 90 percent level).   
However, the difference in the income distributions of in-migrants and out-migrants 
varies considerably between superstar cities and non-superstars.  In superstar MSAs, in-migrants 
are more often rich and less often poor than out-migrants, while in non-superstars there is little 
difference between in-migrants and out-migrants.   This difference in net in-migration is 
statistically significant in four out of five cases, as reported in the bottom row of the table.  This 
comparison is especially useful as it differences out MSA-level characteristics that affect the 
income distribution of in-migrants and out-migrants equally. 
 
7.    Implications of superstar cities:  higher price-to-rent ratios 
  Another implication of the superstar cities framework is that the price-to-rent ratio should 
be higher in superstar cities.  If home buyers correctly anticipate that superstar cities have higher 
than average rent growth, they should be willing to pay a greater multiple of current rents to   28
obtain a house.  This is analogous to the price/earnings ratio being higher for stocks with higher 
expected growth in earnings.
23  
  Table 6 reports results from regressing the log of the ratio of average house value to 
average annual rent on our indicators for superstar status and year dummies.  At the MSA level, 
we find that metropolitan areas that became superstars at any time from 1970-2000 have higher 
price/rent ratios, consistent with the implication that superstar cities should experience higher 
expected rent growth.  Relative to the intermediate B markets, the price/rent ratio is 22 percent 
(with a standard error of 1.4 percent) higher for MSAs that ever were superstars (first row), and 
13 percent (1.2) lower for low demand MSAs (third row).  There is no statistically or 
economically meaningful difference between price-to-rent ratios for non-superstar metros 
(second row) and the omitted group.   
  To show that the higher price/rent ratios are not a spurious characteristic of MSAs that 
happen to become superstars, in column two of Table 6 we add time-varying indicators for 
whether an MSA is classified as a superstar, a non-superstar, or low demand in each census year.  
The results confirm that MSAs’ price-to-rent ratios rise when they become superstars.  
Specifically, MSAs that will become superstars have 10 percent higher price-to-rent ratios than 
the excluded group before they are superstars, but their price-to-rent ratios rise by another 23 
percent (row 4) during their actual superstar period(s).  Non-superstars have similar price-to-rent 
ratios to the in-between group of MSAs when they are not in the non-superstar category, but they 
have a 12 percent lower price-to-rent ratio in those years when their supply is most elastic (row 
5).  Finally, low demand MSAs exhibit their lowest price-to-rent ratios when they are in a low 
demand period (row 6).  This pattern is robust to many specifications, including adding MSA 
                                                 
23 In previous research,  Sinai and Souleles (2005) show that a higher price/rent ratio is associated with a higher 
expected growth rate of rents, measured as the average rent growth over the first nine of the prior 10 years, holding 
constant other important factors including differences in risk (volatility of rents) across metro areas.     29
fixed effects, different linear time trends for each type of MSA superstars, non-superstars, and 
low demand, and different year dummies for each of the four categories of MSAs. 
  At the place level, we find a parallel result to the MSA-based analysis: the price-to-rent 
ratio is higher in superstar suburbs.  We begin by regressing the log price-to-rent ratio on 
whether a place ever is considered a superstar, non-superstar, or low-demand, in column 3.  We 
include indicators for MSA × year to control for unobserved dynamics taking place at the 
metropolitan area level, so in essence we are comparing price-to-rent ratios of superstar and non-
superstar places within the same MSA and same year.  Because of the short time series at the 
place level, we extrapolate superstar status in 1990 or 2000 back to 1970 and 1980.  Relative to 
the omitted, intermediate high demand category, price-to-rent ratios are 14 percent higher for 
superstar (row 1) and 5 percent lower for non-superstar places (row 2).  Price-to-rent ratios in 
low demand places are nearly 16 percent lower than the high-demand, in-between places (row 3).  
All of these results are highly statistically significant. 
In column 4, we examine whether the places that transition in or out of superstar/non-
superstar status experience a change in their price-to-rent ratio.  Because we use lagged data to 
determine contemporaneous superstar status, we restrict the sample to the places for which we 
have data over the 1970 to 2000 period and use only 1990 and 2000 in the regression. These 
restrictions result in a drop from 30,539 to 7,584 observations.  As with the MSAs, the census 
year in which a city achieves superstar status is associated with an increase in the price-to-rent 
ratio, although the coefficient is small and the standard error is relatively high.  Including place 
fixed effects, in results that we do not report here, reduces that standard error sufficiently that the 
positive effect is statistically significant.  Exiting non-superstar status raises the price-to-rent 
ratio by 10.3 percent (with a 3.7 percent standard error).     30
These time-varying place results do not appear to be an artifact of the restricted sample.  
As a consistency check, in column 5 we repeat the estimation strategy from column 3 using the 
smaller sample.  We find qualitatively similar, and still statistically significant, results.
24 
 
8.  Distinguishing superstar cities from alternative explanations  
 
Taken in concert, the empirical evidence above indicates that the superstar cities 
phenomenon must be at least partially responsible for the skewness in growth rates in house 
prices and income sorting that we observe.  While alternative theories of urban growth and 
agglomeration are consistent with some of the facts we have identified, none except for superstar 
cities matches the entire set.  Of course, we do not claim that other potential hypotheses are not 
also valid; rather they cannot be the only explanations.  
  Unlike superstar cities, which contends that house price growth and changes in the 
income distribution at the MSA or place level is merely due to exogenous changes in the income 
distribution and sorting, typical urban theories postulate that there are locational differences in 
underlying value, either as consumption or through production.  In the urban compensating 
differential literature discussed above, high-amenity locations should have permanently higher 
land prices.  However, this literature does not typically address house price growth and there is 
no reason to believe that local amenities happen to improve the most when the number of high 
income people rises.  Moreover, it is difficult to imagine that underlying amenities have 
                                                 
24 Analogously, our MSA results are qualitatively unchanged if we rerun the regressions over the entire 1950-2000 
time period using an indicator of supertar status that is extrapolated to the first two decades.   31
improved nearly enough to account for the dramatic increase in house price dispersion 
experienced across U.S. markets.
25   
Another way to generate persistent differences in house price appreciation is for some 
cities to have faster productivity growth.  If a worker must live in a city to become more 
productive and land supply there is limited, workers will bid up the price of land, firms will have 
to pay higher wages, and land prices ultimately will capitalize the productivity-induced wage 
premium.  If the productivity in the location increases over time, so will the willingness-to-pay to 
live there.  
While we believe that differential agglomeration effects exist across urban areas, there 
are two main reasons why they cannot be the sole explanation for the variation seen in the data.  
First, the fact that we find similar patterns across places within a MSA strongly suggests that 
superstar cities effects exist independently of agglomeration effects.  The effect of productivity 
growth on house prices should occur throughout the labor market area, even when agglomeration 
benefits accrue in the workplace, since MSAs are constructed according to how families 
commute to work.  Income sorting and skewness in house price growth rates at the sub-MSA 
level must be due to some reason other than productivity growth.  Second, there is no reason why 
the income benefits to productivity growth should accrue disproportionately to recent in-
migrants, as in Table 6.
26   
  Some related strands of research, in combination with the superstar cities concept, 
suggest that the broad theory articulated here may be a better fit of the data than the empirical 
                                                 
25 While changes in amenities cannot explain differential growth rates, amenities such as good weather or other 
people with similar preferences (Waldfogel 2003) may be characteristics that make some families prefer one city to 
another.  That, plus growth in the right tail of the income distribution, is the mechanism for superstar cities. 
26 Combining these alternatives, Shapiro (2005) reports results consistent with other changes occurring with respect 
to the local quality life that could help retain high human capital workers who well could be essential to the 
agglomerated firms, thereby reducing their mobility.   32
results indicate.  For example, if production requires a mix of high and low-skill workers, low-
skill workers in superstar cities would earn a premium to enable them to afford living there.  This 
theory could partially explain why superstar cities have a lower apparent poor household share, 
although superstar cities would still have to be the driving force as to why high-skill workers sort 
there in the first place.  Consistent with this possibility, Lee (2005) shows that nurses earn large 
premiums to work in large cities, while doctors actually earn small discounts in the same cities.  
Ortalo-Magne and Rady (2006) develop a theory that helps explain why we observe some poor 
households remaining in the superstar cities.  If a poor family owns its house, its wealth grows at 
the same rate as land prices in a superstar city and thus it can always afford to live in the city, 
even though its wage income alone would not support it.
27   
 
9. Conclusion 
  The dispersion in house price and income growth rates across locations and the skewness 
in house prices, especially the strong growth in the right tail, can be explained in part by inelastic 
land supply in some places combined with growth in the high-income population.  The view that 
some cities and towns have turned into scarce luxury goods, which we label superstar cities, is 
supported by a number of consistent empirical facts.  First, superstar cities and towns have 
higher mean incomes and income distributions that are skewed to the right, consistent with high 
land prices discouraging low-income households from living there.  Income distributions at the 
MSA (or place) level shift right the most when the absolute number of high-income families rise 
at the national (or MSA) level.  This pattern also kicks in more when a location fills up and 
transitions into superstar status.  Second, superstar cities trade at higher price-to-rent ratios and 
                                                 
27 Ortalo-Magne and Rady also note that their theory is consistent with in-migrants having higher incomes than 
existing residents.   33
that ratio expands further when those cities fill up.  Third, superstar MSAs (towns) enjoy 
disproportionately high house price growth when the number of high-income families increases 
at the national (MSA) level. Lastly, recent movers into superstar MSAs are more likely to be rich 
and less likely to be poor than recent movers into other cities. 
  In this framework, house prices do not rise in superstar cities because there is increasing 
value from amenities or productivity benefits.  Instead, the composition of families living in 
superstar cities shifts to those who are willing to pay more as high-income families become more 
numerous.  
  This analysis naturally raises a host of questions.  Can the growth in the house price 
premiums for living in superstar cities and towns persist?  On the demand side, the increasing 
house price gap for superstar cities is dependent on the thickness and length of the right tail of 
the income distribution, so that any reduction in the absolute number of high-income families or 
thinning of the right tail of the wage distribution will put downward pressure on this dispersion 
across cities.  According to Piketty and Saez (2004), since 1940 there has never been a sustained 
drop in either the aggregate income or the average income earned by the top percentile of the 
U.S. income distribution (although the share of income held by that percentile has fallen).  
Further, U.S. cities may be ever-more dependent on the income distribution internationally, with 
superstar residents drawn from the highest income families worldwide.  
What about the supply of superstar cities?  Our model is predicated upon cities being 
imperfectly substitutable, so that each has a clientele of potential residents that prefer it to others.  
However, as cities “enter” the market in response to population growth, they may locate close in 
product space to existing cities, siphoning off some of a city’s clientele.  The net effect will 
depend on the rate of growth of close substitutes, the growth in the high-income population, and   34
the distribution of intensity of tastes.  Second, most existing superstar cities could expand supply 
by increasing density, but choose not to.  The political economy behind that decision is only just 
beginning to be studied. [Glaeser, Gyourko, and Saks (2005a), Ortalo-Magne and Prat (2006)] 
In addition, this dynamic has profound implications for the evolution of urban areas 
because it implies that even large metropolitan areas might evolve into communities that are 
affordable only by the rich, just as exclusive resort areas have done.  Is such an MSA sustainable, 
or does it lose the vibrancy that makes it unique?  Should public policy ensure that living in a 
particular city is available to all families or, since superstar cities and towns are like luxury 
goods, is it reasonable that low income workers can no longer afford to buy homes in superstar 
cities?   35
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Table 1: Real annualized house price growth, 1950-2000, 
Top and Bottom 10 MSAs with 1950 population>500,000 
 
Top 10 MSAs by Price Growth 
Annualized growth rate, 1950-2000 
Bottom 10 MSAs by Price Growth 
Annualized Growth Rate, 1950-2000 
San Francisco  3.53  San Antonio  1.13 
Oakland 2.82  Milwaukee  1.06 
Seattle 2.74  Pittsburgh  1.02 
San Diego  2.61  Dayton  0.99 
Los Angeles  2.46  Albany (NY)  0.97 
Portland (OR)  2.36  Cleveland  0.91 
Boston 2.30  Rochester  (NY)  0.89 
Bergen-Passaic (NJ)  2.19  Youngstown-
Warren  0.81 
Charlotte 2.18  Syracuse  0.67 
New Haven  2.12  Buffalo  0.54 
Population-weighted average of the 50 MSAs in this sample: 1.70 
   38
Table 2: The income distribution in superstar MSAs 
 
   Left-hand-side variable: Share of MSA’s families in income bin: 
   Rich  Middle-rich  Middle Middle-poor  Poor 
Cross-section: 
0.025 0.022 0.042 -0.004  -0.086   
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004)   (0.007) 
Superstari 
[Relative to 
mean share]  [0.833] [0.688] [0.339] [-0.010]  [-0.208] 
0.005 0.003 0.002 -0.023    0.013  Non-superstari 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)   (0.006) 
-0.008 -0.007 -0.010 0.007    0.017  Low Demandi 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004)   (0.007) 
Adj. R
2  0.442 0.621 0.377 0.178 0.214 
Time-varying superstar/non-superstar status 
0.013 0.011 0.035 0.013 -0.071 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005)   (0.009) 
Superstari 
[Relative to 
mean share]  [0.433] [0.344] [0.282]  [0.0325]  [-0.171] 
0.005 0.005 0.002 -0.022    0.010  Non-superstari 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004)   (0.007) 
-0.006 -0.006 -0.009 0.000    0.021  Low Demandi 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004)   (0.007) 
0.028 0.027 0.017 -0.030    -0.041 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.006) (0.008)   (0.015) 
Superstarit 
[Relative to 
mean share]  [0.903] [0.818] [0.135] [-0.075]  [-0.100] 
-0.003 -0.006 -0.004 0.010    0.003  Non-
superstarit  (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.005)   (0.009) 
-0.003 -0.003 -0.003 0.015   -0.006  Low Demandit 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004)   (0.007) 
Adj. R
2  0.504 0.669 0.383 0.207 0.219 













Notes: Number of observations is 1,116, for four decades (1970-2000) and 279 MSAs.  Standard errors are in 
parentheses.  All specifications include year dummies.  Superstarit is equal to 1 when an MSA’s ratio of real annual 
price growth over the previous two decades to its annual housing unit growth over the same period exceeds 1.7 (the 
90
th percentile) and the sum of price and unit growth over that period exceeds the median.  Superstari is equal to 1 
for an MSA if superstarit is ever equal to 1.  Non-superstarit is equal to 1 when the price growth/unit growth ratio is 
below 1/1.7, and non-superstari is an indicator whether non-superstarit is ever 1.  To control for MSA-demand, the 
top panel includes an indicator variable for whether the MSA’s sum of annual price growth and unit growth over any 
20-year period fell below the median in that period.  The bottom panel includes that variable plus a time-varying 
variable for whether the sum of the growth rates over the preceding 20 years was below the median.     39
Table 3 - Panel 1: The income distribution in superstar places 
 
   Left-hand-side variable: Share of place’s families in income bin: 
   Rich  Middle-rich  Middle Middle-poor  Poor 
Cross-section: 
0.052 0.011 -0.004 -0.044 -0.014   
(0.002) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.002)   (0.003) 
Superstari 
[Relative to 
mean share]  [1.486] [0.282] [-0.029] [-0.107] [-0.037] 
-0.017  0.005 0.030 0.040    -0.057  Non-superstari 
(0.002)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)   (0.003) 
-0.032 -0.014  -0.020  0.009    0.056  Low Demandi 
(0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)   (0.002) 
Adj. R
2  0.130  0.098 0.041 0.036 0.064 
Mean of LHS: 
Superstari=0  0.035  0.039 0.136 0.412 0.377 
 
Notes: Number of observations is 31,200 over four decades (1970-2000).  This is not a rectangular panel.  Standard 
errors are in parentheses.  All specifications include MSA x year dummies.  Superstari is equal to 1 if a place’s ratio 
of real annual price growth over the previous two decades to its annual housing unit growth over the same period 
ever exceeds 2.06 (the 75
th percentile) and the sum of price and unit growth over that period exceeds the median.  
Non-superstari is equal to 1 if the price growth/unit growth ratio is ever below 1/2.06 and the sum of price and unit 
growth over that period exceeds the median.  Low demandi is an indicator variable for whether the place’s sum of 
annual price growth and unit growth over any 20-year period fell below the median in that period.    40
Table 3 - Panel 2: The income distribution in superstar places, 1990-2000 
 
   Left-hand-side variable: Share of place’s families in income bin: 
   Rich  Middle-rich  Middle Middle-poor  Poor 
Time-varying superstar/non-superstar status 
0.037 0.008 -0.001  -0.024    -0.020 
(0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.007)   
Superstari 
[Relative to 
mean share]  [0.804] [0.140] [-0.006]  [-0.062]  [-0.057] 
-0.033 -0.001 0.023  0.038   -0.026  Non-superstari 
(0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004)   (0.007) 
-0.055 -0.021 -0.016 0.039    0.052  Low Demandi 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)   (0.005) 
0.042 -0.001 -0.022 -0.027   0.008 
(0.005) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005)   (0.008) 
Superstarit 
[Relative to 
mean share]  [0.857] [-0.017] [-0.137] [-0.070] [0.023] 
-0.014 -0.004 -0.001 0.009    0.010  Non-
superstarit  (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005)   (0.008) 
-0.012 -0.015 -0.029 -0.008   0.063  Low Demandit 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)   (0.005) 
Adj. R
2  0.242 0.240 0.116 0.124 0.188 
Cross-section: 
0.066 0.010 -0.012  -0.041  -0.023 
(0.003) (0.001) (0.002)  (0.003)   (0.005) 
Superstari 
[Relative to 
mean share]  [1.435] [0.175] [-0.075]  [-0.106]  [-0.066] 
-0.042 -0.001 0.027  0.045   -0.028  Non-superstari 
(0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)   (0.004) 
-0.065 -0.031 -0.034 0.035    0.096  Low Demandi 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)   (0.003) 
Adj. R
2  0.233 0.229 0.093 0.119 0.172 













Notes: Number of observations is 7,584 over two decades (1990-2000), 3,792 places per decade.  Standard errors are 
in parentheses.  All specifications include MSA x year dummies.  Superstarit is equal to 1 when a place’s ratio of 
real annual price growth over the previous two decades to its annual housing unit growth over the same period 
exceeds 2.06 (the 75
th percentile) and the sum of price and unit growth over that period exceeds the median.  
Superstari is equal to 1 for a place if superstarit is ever equal to 1.  Non-superstarit is equal to 1 when the price 
growth/unit growth ratio is below 1/2.06, and non-superstari is an indicator whether non-superstarit is ever 1.  Low 
demand it is an indicator variable for whether the MSA’s sum of annual price growth and unit growth over the prior 
20-year period fell below the median in that period.  Low demand i is equal to 1 if low demand it ever equals 1.     41
Table 4: How Changes in the Number of the Nation’s or MSA’s Rich Differentially Affect 
House Prices and the Fraction Rich in Superstar and Non-Superstar Cities or Places 
 
 Left-hand-side 
variable:  Log of the 10
th Percentile House Value  Share of families that are in the “rich” category 
Unit of observation 
MSA × year  Place × year  Place × year  MSA × year  Place × year  Place × year 
0.140 0.098 0.119 0.031 0.022 0.027  Superstari  × 
log(Number Richkt)  (0.044) (0.010) (0.011) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
-0.003 -0.181 -0.121 0.004 -0.009 -0.016  Non-Superstari × 
log(Number Richkt)  (0.036) (0.009) (0.011) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
-0.176 -0.155 -0.123 -0.013 -0.025 -0.033  Low Demandi × 
log(Number Richkt)  (0.040) (0.007) (0.008) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Fixed effects:  MSA, year  Place,  
MSA × Year 
Place,  
MSA × Year  MSA, year  Place,  
MSA × Year 
Place,  
MSA × Year 
N  1,116 31,190  15,170 1,116 31,200  15,170 
Rectangular 
sample?  Yes No Yes Yes No Yes 
Adj. R
2  0.259 0.093 0.203 0.233 0.127 0.162 
 
Notes: The sample period is 1970-2000.  At the MSA level, it covers 279 MSAs over four decades.  At the place level, the rectangular sample uses the 3,792 
Census-designated Places for which we have data over the entire period.  The larger sample also uses places that enter the data set post-1970.  Standard errors are 
in parentheses.  Superstari is equal to 1 for an MSA [place] if ever an MSA’s [place’s] ratio of real annual price growth over the previous two decades to its 
annual housing unit growth over the same period exceeds 1.7 [2.06] (the 90
th percentile) and the sum of price and unit growth over that period exceeds the 
median.  Non-superstari is equal to 1 if ever the price growth/unit growth ratio is below 1/1.7 [1/2.06] and the sum of price and unit growth over that period 
exceeds the median.  To control for demand, low demandi is an indicator variable for whether the MSA’s [place’s] sum of annual price growth and unit growth 
over any 20-year period fell below the median in that period.  Each of these variables is interacted with the either the national number of families in the “rich” 
category (in the MSA specifications) or the MSA number “rich” (in the place-level specifications).  The uninteracted variables are subsumed by the fixed effects.  42
Table 5: The difference among superstar MSAs in the income distribution of movers 
 
  Income Bins 
 




     
(i) Superstarit 
[Relative to mean share 

















[Relative to mean share 

















2  0.0632 0.1112 0.1354 0.0587 0.0657 
(A) With what 
confidence level is 
(i) – (ii) ≠  0? 
99% 99% 99% 27% 99% 
Out-migrants:       
(iii) Superstarit 
[Relative to mean share 

















[Relative to mean share 

















2  0.1358 0.3005 0.2699 0.1468 0.2226 
(B) With what 
confidence level is 
(iii) – (iv) ≠  0? 
5% 90%  99%  70%  93% 
With what confidence 
level is 
(A) – (B) ≠  0? 
91% 99% 99% 58% 99% 
Notes: The left-hand-side variable is the share of the MSA’s number of in-migrants (or out-migrants) that are in the 
income category.  The sample is restricted to 1980 and 1990 and the 231 MSAs per year  for which we have 
migration data.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  All specifications include a year dummy and a control for low 
demand MSAs.  Standard errors in parentheses.  Superstarit is equal to 1 when an MSA’s ratio of real annual price 
growth over the previous two decades to its annual housing unit growth over the same period exceeds 1.7 (the 90
th 
percentile) and the sum of price and unit growth over that period exceeds the median.  Non-superstarit is equal to 1 
when the price growth/unit growth ratio is below 1/1.7.  To control for MSA-demand, the regressions include an 
indicator variable for whether the sum of the growth rates over the preceding 20 years was below the median.  The 
out-migrant regressions also include the share of the MSA’s families in the income category as a control.   43
 
 Table 6: Price-to-rent ratios and superstars 
 
Left-hand-side 
variable:   Log average house value/average rent 
Unit of 























-0.004 -0.012 -0.045 -0.121 -0.165 
Non-superstari 
(0.011) (0.012) (0.010) (0.031) (0.021) 
-0.131 -0.100 -0.155 -0.128 -0.241 
Low Demandi 
(0.012) (0.013) (0.007) (0.022) (0.016) 
 0.227  0.048  
Superstarit 
 (0.025)  (0.034)  
 -0.119  -0.103  
Non-superstarit 
 (0.015)  (0.037)  
 -0.093  -0.163  
Low Demandit 
 (0.012)  (0.022)  
Fixed effects  Year  Year  MSA × year  MSA × year  MSA × year 
N 1,116  1,116  30,539  7,584  7,584 
Sample  period  1970-2000 1970-2000 1970-2000 1990-2000 1990-2000 
Adj. R
2  0.450 0.548 0.065 0.153 0.135 
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.  Superstarit is equal to 1 when an MSA’s [place’s] ratio of real annual 
price growth over the previous two decades to its annual housing unit growth over the same period exceeds 1.7 
[2.06] (the 90
th percentile) and the sum of price and unit growth over that period exceeds the median.  Superstari is 
equal to 1 for an MSA if superstarit is ever equal to 1.  Non-superstarit is equal to 1 when the price growth/unit 
growth ratio is below 1/1.7 [1/2.06], and non-superstari is an indicator whether non-superstarit is ever 1.  Low 
demandi is  an indicator variable for whether the sum of annual price growth and unit growth over any 20-year 
period fell below the median in that period.  Low demandit is a time-varying variable for whether the sum of the 
growth rates over the preceding 20 years was below the median.  
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Appendix Table A1: MSA Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean  Standard  deviation 
MSA time-invariant characteristics:    
Average Annual Real House Price Growth,  
   1950-2000 (N=279)  1.57 0.56 
Average Annual Housing Unit Growth,  
   1950-2000 (N=279)  2.10 0.98 
Average Annual Real Income Growth,  
   1950-2000 (N=279)  1.82 0.35 
Ever a “superstar”  0.165 [46]  0.372 
Ever a “non-superstar”  0.337 [94]  0.474 
Ever “low demand”  0.821 [229]  0.384 
MSA time-varying characteristics:    
Average 20-year Real House Price Growth  1.50  1.04 
Average 20-year Housing Unit Growth  2.10  1.20 
Average 20-year house price growth + housing 
unit growth  3.60 1.86 
Average ratio of 20-year price growth to 20-
year unit growth  0.936 0.642 
Real house value  111,329  54,889 
Average price/average annual rent  17.00  3.99 
Year #  “superstars” #  “non-superstars” 
1970 3  55 
1980 3  34 
1990 30  43 
2000 21  36 
Income Distribution Mean Standard  deviation 
Share of an MSA’s population that is “rich”  0.033  0.021 
Share “middle-rich”  0.035  0.024 
Share “middle”  0.129  0.043 
Share “middle-poor”  0.400  0.050 
Share “poor”  0.402  0.095 
National number “rich”    
1970 1,571,136   
1980 1,312,103   
1990 2,611,178   
2000 4,098,324   
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Appendix Table A2: Place Summary Statistics  
(Full sample: N=31,200) 
Variable Mean  Standard  deviation 
Place time-invariant characteristics:    
Average Real House Price Growth  0.013  0.015 
Average Housing Unit Growth,   0.015  0.023 
Average Real Income Growth  0.028  0.029 
Ever a “superstar”  0.113   0.316 
Ever a “non-superstar”  0.113   0.316 
Ever “low demand”  0.556   0.497 
Place time-varying characteristics:    
Average 20-year Real House Price Growth  0.013  0.016 
Average 20-year Housing Unit Growth  0.016  0.023 
Average 20-year house price growth + housing 
unit growth  0.029 0.030 
Mean real house value  123,600  101,081 
10
th Percentile house value  68,758  64,139 
Average price/average annual rent  16.21  7.45 
Year #  “superstars” #  “non-superstars” 
1990 387  272 
2000 837  870 
Income Distribution Mean Standard  deviation 
Share of an place’s population that is “rich”  0.045  0.084 
Share “middle-rich”  0.043  0.046 
Share “middle”  0.141  0.079 
Share “middle-poor”  0.405  0.101 
Share “poor”  0.365  0.167 
MSA number “rich”    
1970 16,216   
1980 10,072   
1990 19,963   
2000 30,499   
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Appendix Table A2: Place Summary Statistics  
(Rectangular sample: N=3,792 per decade) 
Variable Mean  Standard  deviation 
Place time-invariant characteristics:    
Avg. Real House Price Growth (1970-2000)  0.015  0.011 
Avg. Housing Unit Growth (1970-2000)  0.017  0.019 
Avg. Real Income Growth (1970-2000)  0.007  0.007 
Ever a “superstar”  0.154   0.361 
Ever a “non-superstar”  0.124   0.330 
Ever “low demand”  0.618  0.486 
Place time-varying characteristics: (1970-2000)    
Average 20-year Real House Price Growth  0.015  0.017 
Average 20-year Housing Unit Growth  0.016  0.021 
Average 20-year house price growth + housing 
unit growth  0.031 0.028 
Mean real house value  156,634  125,393 
10
th Percentile house value  90,703  79,105 
Average price/average annual rent  17.75  7.60 
Year #  “superstars” #  “non-superstars” 
1990 381  272 
2000 446  327 
Income Distribution (1970-2000) Mean Standard  deviation 
Share of an place’s population that is “rich”  0.062  0.092 
Share “middle-rich”  0.065  0.048 
Share “middle”  0.166  0.070 
Share “middle-poor”  0.375  0.082 
Share “poor”  0.332  0.154 
MSA number “rich”    
1970 16,214   
1980 13,358   
1990 26,765   
2000 39,549   
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Figure 1A: Density of 1950-2000 Annualized Real House Price Growth Rates









0.2% 0.5% 0.8% 1.1% 1.4% 1.7% 2.0% 2.3% 2.6% 2.9% 3.2% 3.5% 3.8%


















Figure 1B: Density of 1950-2000 Annualized Real Income Growth Rates
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Figure 2A 
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Figure 3
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Figure 4
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Figure 7: San Francisco (big price growth)
gains rich, loses poor
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Figure 8: Las Vegas (big unit growth)
gains rich and poor, shares stay constant
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